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It should not take a funeral: An Introduction to the Dialogue on the Self-Control Construct
New ideas must be promoted and old ones challenged.  This is how science evolves and 
paradigms shift (Kuhn 1962). Unfortunately, if this is left to happen organically – that is, via the 
competition of ideas -- the evolution may be very slow. For new ideas to flourish, at the very 
extreme, it may actually take the death of a prominent scientist (Azoulay et al. 2019). Or, to 
quote Max Planck, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation 
grows up that is familiar with it.”
I believe that the field of consumer psychology is more open and accepting of new ideas 
than the life sciences field which Azoulay et al. studied (and, clearly, we do not want any 
funerals or early retirements). However, we still have a long way to go.  Dialogues, such as this 
one, allow for re-examination of accepted theories, methods and results; and permit novel ideas 
to transform entrenched ways of thinking.  This is not the first dialogue of this nature – for an 
earlier example, see Gal and Rucker’s (2018) inquiry into the evidence for loss aversion.  In the 
same spirit of revisiting and critically assessing established modes of research, this dialogue by 
Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (2020, VSH) focuses on the self-control concept and the construct 
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Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh criticize the often-used conceptualization of self-control as 
“abstinence from hedonic consumption”, and its related measurement. Instead, based upon on 
self-control theories in economics and finance, they define self-control as “the sacrifice of 
immediate, short term gratification in service of more important, long term benefits”. Building 
up from this definition, they argue that “resolving the conflict in favor of immediate gratification 
will hence lead to regretting one’s choice”, and therefore “the expectation that one will regret 
yielding to a temptation is hence a clear marker that the behavior involved represents a self-
control failure”.  They look at 125 articles across 12 journals of relevance to us and show that in 
nearly all (120 of them), the stimuli representing self-control failure were hedonic foods, 34.4%  
as chocolate cake, chips and ice cream, also described in these articles as “unhealthy, tempting, 
indulgent, affectively superior, tasty, vice, or want foods”. In 52.2% of the studies in these 
articles, self-control was indicated through a choice between two foods, one of which was 
hedonic (choosing the hedonic food meant a loss of self-control); whereas it was indicated 
through the amount of hedonic food eaten in an ad libitum task (more suggested lower self-
control). The implicit assumption was that choosing a hedonic food (or having more of a hedonic 
food) implied choosing a short-term taste goal over a long-term health goal, and would result in 
anticipated regret.  But, in none of these articles was anticipated regret measured, and only a 
handful measured regret at all (post-decision regret). 
VSH then present two studies of their own, conducted for this target article.  In the first, 
they study whether people’s understanding of “self-control failure” maps on to choosing 
hedonism over utilitarianism and/or to whether the decision violates a superordinate long-term 
goal which creates anticipated regret. They conduct the second study using real choices in Korea, 
and show that students who face a self-control conflict, in choosing to go to a movie versus 
receiving a pen, experience higher anticipated regret compared to those who do not face such a 
conflict (the self-control conflict is created when the movie is close in time to an upcoming 
exam).
VSH generously leave us with many open questions for future research, such as boundary 
conditions for anticipating regret, and individual differences in anticipating regret (e.g., are good 
self-controllers more likely to anticipate regret – and therefore more likely to adhere to the 
superordinate goal?).  Lamberton discusses these issues further in her commentary. She identifies 
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VSH, higher self-control means choosing against anticipated regret) – one of these risks 
discusses how easier behavior (lower self-control) may, in fact, be associated with choosing 
against anticipated regret, e.g., whether to confess to a partner after having an affair, knowing 
that this may result in losing the partner.  I leave the reader to peruse Lamberton’s commentary 
for details of the other two risks.  More broadly, Lamberton suggests that VSH’s definition of 
self-control through anticipated regret represents “consumption self-control”; whereas, an 
alternate definition by Peirce (Weiss 1934) characterizes reflexive self-control, which operates 
independent of anticipated regret.  Together, VSH’s and Lamberton’s discussions, indicate that 
researchers should explicitly specify how they define self-control, and use pretests for ensuring 
that it is indeed this definition they are capturing in their measures. 
Mochon and Schwartz’s (MS) commentary generalizes the argument of VSH.  They 
make a case for the importance of establishing construct validity of measures used to capture 
specific concepts, and provide two additional examples beyond the self-control example in VSH. 
MS’s first example is of “choice overload”. Unlike self-control in the target article, here, the 
independent variable, and not the dependent variable, is the operationalized construct.  MS 
suggest that choice overload could be conceptualized through its underlying psychological 
construct (a negative state elicited by the choice context), but is typically conceptualized by the 
number of options in the choice set. But, are the two the same, and does the latter always result 
in the former? 
The second example is of “loss aversion”, which has also garnered a different kind of 
dialog in JCP (the Gal and Rucker 2018 dialog discussed earlier), about whether the evidence for 
loss aversion is compelling. MS point out that the underlying concern is about whether empirical 
evidence to demonstrate a particular construct in one context can subsequently be used 
indiscriminately in other contexts to indicate the same construct.  VSH respond to the two 
commentaries but focus their response on Lamberton’s critique.
In addition to the points these authors raise, I want to raise another issue regarding 
construct validity in consumer psychology.  There is a conundrum I have always had regarding 
the diffusion of measurement scales in our field, i.e., how accepted they get -- how used they are 
in further research.  I find that scales seem to be equally well accepted, whether they are 
rigorously designed and proposed as stand-alone papers (let’s call them rigorously designed 
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paper (let’s call these convenience scales). Rigorously designed scales would have tests of 
discriminant, convergent, and nomological validity, among other things. Examples of such scales 
are the Need For Touch scale (Peck and Childers 2003), the Propensity To Plan scale (Lynch et 
al. 2009), and the GREEN scale (. 
Convenience scales, on the other hand, are typically designed with little testing, because 
other scales to capture a construct do not exist, and the paper needs a scale to capture that 
construct.  These scales can be simple 3 or 5 item scales.  I will not add to the heat in this 
dialogue by giving examples of other authors here; with my co-authors’ permission, I will give 
the example of my own perceived movement scale (Cian, Krishna and Elder, 2014) as one such 
convenience scale.  Cian, Elder and I constructed this scale to measure if our experiment stimuli 
represented low versus high perceived movement, which was the independent variable – in other 
words, the scale was used for a manipulation check. Perceived movement was a relatively new 
concept at that time and we did not find other appropriate scales for it. We created a very simple 
two-item scale to measure perceived movement, and since then, our scale has been used in other 
research as well.  However, we will openly acknowledge that it is not developed with the same 
rigor as the first set of scales.  
Clearly, a more rigorously designed scale would have higher construct validity, which 
would also result in greater robustness of findings, and likelihood of replication.  Unfortunately, 
I think most of the new scales developed in consumer psychology work are convenience scales. 
[I acknowledge that a hypothetico-deductive paper, cannot at the same time, be a scale 
development paper since the latter is a full manuscript in itself; I just wish to point out here that 
the rigorously created scales and the convenience scales are treated with the same reverence in 
our field, when they should not.]
Between all these issues regarding the construct validity of concepts – the methods, 
measures and stimuli used for our constructs -- the dialogue leaves us with the dismaying 
conclusion that a vast number of studies in consumer psychology spread across many sub-fields 
may not be examining the construct they suggest they are, potentially undermining the validity of 
the research findings (and contributing to replication problems).  The constructs examined in this 
dialogue are just examples, and the problem is more far-reaching.  But, to revert to my initial 
thought, that is exactly what we should be doing – questioning our paradigms and practices, even 
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But, on a more constructive note, the dialogue also suggests that there are certain things 
we can agree on.  For instance, we should pay more attention to construct validity - defining 
what a construct that we use means to us, pre-testing our measures to see if they capture these 
constructs, even going back to “source authors” on established constructs to see if subsequent 
operationalizations actually fit, reading and writing papers with a focus on construct validity at 
least as much as on statistical precision, and understanding that the results of even a highly-
powered preregistered study are ambiguous if our construct validity was weak to begin with. 
Moving on to the bigger question of entrenched ideas, we need to think about how 
entrenchment occurs, and how we can cut through it.  Perhaps, it occurs because the reviewers 
are part of the co-author circle of a senior academic whose work the article challenges; but they 
are even more likely to occur because reviewers are unwilling (or unable) to think beyond 
entrenched ideas, especially those of established researchers. Journals need to be more cognizant 
of these possibilities.  
I have faith that we can make changes, and that we don’t need a funeral.
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